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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED 
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY 
COMPANY, E~ corporation, 
Respondents, 
v. 
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Appellant. 
1 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATE11ENT OF· FACTS 
Case No. 
8351 
The respondents agree generally with the State-
ment of Facts in the Appellant's Brief. Certain incon-
sistencies are noted and additional facts are called to 
the Court's attention. 
One of the important provisions of the agreement 
between Sprague and appellant is that the appellant, 
the subcontractor, wa~ to proceed with the work by 
breaking the rock in a workmanlike manner and com-
plete the same without unreasonable delay (R. 8, Par. 
2). 
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On page 2 of appellant's brief it is stated that the 
subcontract provided for the production of the rock by 
the joint efforts of appellant and Sprague. rrhis is pro-
bably the appellant's interpretation of the subcontract. 
The contract speaks for itself. It is true that Sprague 
was to do certain things such as procure a licemw from 
the owner of the rock to enter upon the premises to 
mine and remove the rock and to furnish Boyles with 
sufficient compressed air to efficiently operate its drill 
(R. 8, Par. 3). But said subcontract did not provide for 
the production of rock by the joint efforts of appPllant 
and Sprague. 
On page 2 of appellant's brief it is stated that 
Sprague agreed--- "to remove the rock from the quarry 
as it was broken into sizes specified 'so as not to (·ause 
delay' ". No such provision is contained in tl1e agree-
ment. 
The agreement does contain the following provision 
in paragraph 10 pertaining to what the subcontractor 
was to do, ''all secondary breaking of rock shall coincide 
with hauling operations so as nort to cause delay" (R. 
10). 
On page 4 of appellant's brief the last sentence of 
the first paragraph is not a correct statement. The plead-
ing of appellant is entirely different as it appears in 
paragraph 6, page 4 of defendant's Answer and Coun-
terclaim (R. 14 & 15). 
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Respondents dispute the statement on page 5 of 
appellant's brief that there was no determination made 
by the Court of the controlling issues in the case. 
Although appellant's employees had some difficul-
ties with the air compressor furnished by Sprague in 
that it was difficult to start in the morning and that 
tht're was clutch trouble and battery trouble during the 
latter part of December, 1949, and the month of January 
1950, apparently the trouble was not important to the 
appellant because the actual written contract was not 
executed until the 25th day of January, 1950 (R. 8). Ap-
pellant's witness, Lowery, tes~ified that there was ample 
air to operate the drill which they wanted to drill with 
(R. 336). 
The blast of February 3, 1950, did not produce suf-
ficient rock of the size specifjed for use on the project. 
As late as July 31, 1950, a great preponderance of the 
rock in the quarry was too large to meet the specifica-
tions and had to be reduced before it could be hauled 
(R. 89). A very small portion of the rock in the quarry 
after the blast of February 3, 1950, could be placed on 
the revetment (R. 90). At that time at least eighty per-
cent of the rock was consider1:1 bly over the weight of 350 
pounds, that being the largest size which could be used, 
and running up to about three tons ( R. 90). 
Because the rock was not hJ·oken to the specified size, 
it was necessary for Sprague's employees to sort the 
rock in the pile and push the oversize rock aside to get 
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to the rock which was broken to size ( R. 306 & 168). 
This caused delay and increased costs in loading and 
hauling the rock. 
:Mr. Karlsten, the man in charge of the project of 
breaking rock for appellant, had never before personally 
supervised or done any rock blasting where rock of the 
size of 50 to 350 pounds had to be produced (R. 303). He 
had never broken any rock in this particular quarry be-
fore (R. 301). He did not put any test holes and made 
no tests concerning the method of breaking this rock 
before the coyote hole was put in by him (R. 301). 
It was respondents' theory that appellant did not 
use a proper method to break rock in this quarry to 
produce rock of size from 50 to 350 pounds. That the 
coyote hole method used by appellant was not a work-
manlike manner of proceeding with the work (R. 164 and 
165). Testimony of qualified experts was offered and, 
upon objection of the appellant that this testimony was 
immaterial, the Court sustained the objection and ap-
pellant was prevented from introducing the evidence 
(R. 164, 173, 189). 
On page 6 of appellant's brief appears the statement 
that Sprague made no attempt to remove any of the 
contract rock from the quarry, referring to the latter 
part of F'ebruary, 1950. This is not the fact. Rock could 
not be moved because of restrictions on the use of the 
roads (R. 169). 
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On page 8 of appellant's brief there appears a state-
ment which indicates there was no compressor in the 
quarry from September 21 until October 5. This is not 
the fact. rrhere was a 105 compressor in the quarry 
during that period (R. 299 & 413). 
There is no conflict between the two respondents. 
~o as to elin1inate any question as to the right of re-
covery between the principal and the surety and any 
question of who was the real party in interest, both 
were made plaintiffs and two separate causes of action 
were alleged in the complaint. The first cause of action 
was on behalf of Sprague and the second cause of action 
was on behalf of United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company (R. 1 to 10). At the trial both plaintiffs, by 
their counsel, agreed that any judgment that might be 
obtained might be taken jointly in the name of both 
plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were not concerned 
with prorating any recovery (R. 76). 
The con tract between the parties was prepared by 
the appellant ( R. 405) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS PROPER 
AND THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. 
The respondents have no quarrel with appellant's 
authorities cited under Point I of appellant's brief, but 
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respondents do not agree with the appellant's interpre-
tation of the agreement between Sprague and Boyles (R. 
8-10). 
Appellant contends that 1t performed its part of thP 
contract by putting in a coyote hole tunnel 75 feet into 
the face of the quarry and two wings at the end 30 feet 
on each side of the tunnel and setting off a large blast 
of powder and loosening the cliff of the quarry, knock-
ing down into the quarry a large tonnage of oversize 
rock and then secondarily blasting the large rock on the 
surface of the pile and waitir1g until Sprague, with the 
shovel in the quarry, sorted rock which could be used 
and set aside or uncovered large rocks which could not 
be used when appellant would then secondarily blast the 
large rock to the specified size of 50 to 350 pounds. Res-
pondents contend that such perfor1nance did not consti-
tute the breaking of rock into sizes between 50 pounds 
and 350 pounds in a workmanlike manner without unrea-
sonable delay. 
Appellant contends that the evidence establishes 
that the only breach of the subcontract was that com-
mitted by the plaintiffs. This is not the fact. 
Boyles started on the job in the quarry on December 
18, 1949 ( R. 287). The initial blast to produce rock was 
not set off until F'ebruary 3, 1950. Eighty percent of 
the rock knocked down was cversize (R. 90). Sprague's 
difficulty on the job was his inability to get sufficient 
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rock of proper size to put on the dike in the revetment 
area (R. 98). Boyles had no equipment in the quarry to 
segregate the rock of proper size from that of iinproper 
size. They brought to the quarry in December, 1949, a 
Leyner, a bar, a water pump, the water tank, four pick-
ups, and hoses and steel and bits (R. 333). A jackhammer 
was in the quarry after the blast from February 3 to 
F"'ebruary 11, 1950 (R. 339). \Vhen Lowery, an employee 
of Boyles, left the quarry on February 11, 1950, there 
were between 400 and 600 tons of rock of acceptable size 
visible in the quarry (R. 33!:)). On April 24, 1950, when 
Lowery returned to the quarry, he brought to the quarry 
a light plant, hoses, connections, three jackhammers, and 
approximately two dozen pieces of steel (R. 341). While 
there, he shot 60 holes (R. 342). Boyles had no equip-
ment to drag down rock from the sides of the quarry 
( R. 345). They had no cater pillar tractor in the quarry 
for the purpose of separating the large rock from the 
rock which had been reduced to size (R. 346). Nothing 
was done by Boyles to get th~ large rocks that were up 
on the side of the quarry down into the quarry and, from 
April 24 until May 1, 1950, the only rock which was re-
duced to size was that which was convenient to start 
hauling (R. 347). 
Hauling of rock started il' May, 1950, for only a few 
days and was discontinued when all the acceptable rock 
was taken from the quarry (R. 116). 
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After the May hauling, Sprague brought to the quar-
ry a Traxcavator to sort the rock in the quarry (R. 117). 
Employees of Sprague attempted to break rock by pla~t­
ering and shooting ( R. 117). This was done by Sprague 
because sufficient rock was not available to keep the 
trucks operating (R. 118). r:ehese things were part of 
the breaking of the rock which should have been done 
by Boyles. Mrs. Fern Sprague, the wife of Walter 
Sprague, kept the records on the job (R. 135). She testi-
fied in detail concerning the expenses incurred by 
Sprague in the production of rock which was the obliga-
tion of Boyles. She made summaries of the various 
items of expense and fully explained all the facts and 
circumstances to the Court (R. 136-158). 
The appellant complains of the failure of Sprague 
to make the progress payme11t provided in the subcon-
tract of 75% of the contract price of 48c per ton by April 
20, 1950. This payment was not made until July 26, 1950, 
and was paid by check from United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Company (R. 211). The payment was 75% 
of 48c per ton for 12,200 tons of rock (R. 211). Mr. 
Murray calculated the payment as if the contract had 
been performed (R. 211). The respondent did not com-
plain of the failure to make this payment on April 20, 
1950 as provided 1n the con tract. The only reasonable 
conclusion that can be reached is that, on that date, 
Boyles knew that not sufficient rock had been broken 
to justify the payment. It will be remembered that no 
rock was hauled from the quarry by April 20, 1950, the 
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job because of the failure to make this progress payment. 
They stayed on the job until October 5, 1950, more than 
two months after receiving the payment. 
There was some difficulty about compressed air. 
Appellant complains that their employees had to handle 
the compressor. ~Ir. Lowery, the man in charge of the 
breaking of rock in the quarry, testified that it would be 
foolish to have Sprague furnish a man to start the com-
pressor, and put in gasoline and oil (R. 348). No request 
was made of Sprague to furnish a man to do those things 
(R. 348). On no occasion, when repairs to the compressor 
were needed, did Sprague refuse to take steps to have 
it repaired (R. 350). 
On this subject of determining the materrality of a 
failure to perform, the following from 'Seetion 275, Re-
statement of the Law of Contracts, is enlightening: 
"In determining the materiality of a failure 
fully to perform a promise the following circum-
stances are influential: 
(a) The extent to which the injured party 
will obtain the substantial benefit which he could 
have reasonably anticipated; 
(b) The extent t0 which the injured party 
may be adequately compensated in damages for 
lack of complete performance; 
(c) The extent to which the party failing to 
perform has already partly performed or made 
preparations for performance; 
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(d) The greater or less hardship on the party 
failing to perform in terminating the contract; 
(e) The wilful, negligent or innocent be-
havior of t:he party faiiing to perform; 
(f) The greater or less uncertainty that the 
party failing to perform will perform the re-
mainder of the contraet." 
Under this section appears the foUowing comment: 
"a. It is impossible to lay down a rule that 
can be applied with mathematical exactness to 
answer the problem-when does a failure to per-
form a promise discharge the duty to perform 
the return promise for an agreed exchange. Only 
such general principles based on inherent justice 
of the matter as are stated in this Section can be 
asserted. Where the failure is at the outset, a 
very slight failure is often sufficient to discharge 
the injured party. But even in that case, and more 
obviously if the failu1·e of a promisor occurs after 
part performance by him, the question becomes 
one of degree. Both the amount he has done and 
the benefit that the injured party has received are 
considered. The question then to be answered is: 
Will it be more conrJrmable to justice in the 
particular oase to free the injured party, or, on 
the other hand, to r~quire him to perform his 
promise, in both cases giving him a right of action 
if the failure to perform was wrongful. In the one 
case damages are based on breach of the whole 
contract; in the other on the loss caused by the 
partial breach. While the wilfulness of the 
breach, except in contracts for personal service, 
may not enhance the injury, yet it does so far 
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increase the dement uf the wrongdoer that the 
law is less inclined if a breach is wilful! to require 
the injured party to perform." 
The trial Court found that Sprague performed his 
part of the contract and there is -ample evidence in the 
record to sustain that fin din~-
POINT II 
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT BREAK THE ROCK INTO 
CONTRACT SIZE IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER. 
Although appellant objected, and objection was sus-
tained, to testimony offered to be given hy two experts 
concerning the proper method to produce rock in this 
quarry ( R. 164, 173 and 189), there is sufficient evidence 
from which the Court could find that the rock was not 
broken in a workmanlike manner. 
After Boyles worked under the subeontract for more 
than five weeks, or until February 3, 1950, the initial 
blast was set off. A picture of the quarry after the blast 
was set off was introduced in evidence (R. 85, Ex. 25). 
This picture itself shows the ~ondition of the rock. After 
this much valuable time had been consumed, rock could 
not be hauled to the projec~ be0ause of the large size 
of the rock and the fact that large and proper size rock 
were all mixed together in the pile. Eighty percent of 
the rock was oversize (R. 90). After this blast in the 
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12 
quarry of February 3, 1950, a shovel could not ~tart 
loading to haul rock out to the project in sizes called for 
by the contract specifications (R. 166 and 1(i7). 
No atten1pt is here made to detail all the evidem·e 
given at the trial on the manner in which the rock was 
broken. The record is full of similar testimony. There 
is ample evidence to support the finding of the Court 
that the appellant did not break the rock into contract 
size in a workm•anlike manner. 
Several places in appellant's brief statements are 
made that, after respondents started to break rock, 
they did so in the same manner as did the appellant. 
This is not true. Boyles put in ,a "coyote" hole in an at-
ternpt to produce the rock. When Sprague took over, 
he went up on top of the shelf above the quarry and used 
a wagon drill to drill holes down into the rock and then 
blasted using these holes (R. 133 and 250). 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT 
THE COST TO PLAINTIFF OF PRODUCING THE ADDI-
TIONAL ROCK EXCEEDED WHAT HE AGREED TO 
PAY DEFENDANT. 
The point raised by appellant applies only to the 
rock produced by respondents after appellant walked 
off the job in October, 1950. 
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The Court did, in its written memorHndum, refer to 
the cost to Sprague of breaking of rock as 45.5 cents per 
ton, or a savings of 2.5 cents per ton under the contract 
price (R. 23). 
It is evident, from an examination of the evidence, 
that, when the trial Judge in his memorandum, figured 
the cost of breaking rock by Sprague, he did not con-
sider all of the expenses of Sprague in the production 
of the rock during the period after Boyles quit the job. 
This Court's attention is called to Exhibits 7-P and 
8-P introduced in evidence upon the testimony of F'ern 
Sprague who kept the books and records for Sprague (R. 
137 and 156). The original figures on the first page of 
Exhibit 8 were the actual cost to Sprague of producing 
rock after Boyles left the quarry. The total originally 
amounted to $6,770.45. On the second page of Exhibit 8 
originally appeared a credit for 1,000 tons of rock sold 
to Mathews at 48 cents per ton or $480 and the original 
statement figures showed as the amount owed to Sprague 
by Boyles the sum of $5, 790.0!>. Mrs. Sprague explained 
that it cost Sprague considerably more than 48 cents per 
ton to produce the rock and that she revised the figures 
. so as to give Boyles credit for the 1,000 tons of rock sold 
to Mathews at the cost of producing it, or $1,185.23 (R. 
138). The figures then on the first page of Exhibit 8 
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were all reduced in proportion and the total reduced from 
$6,770.45 to $5,585.22, which corrected figure was rar-
ried over onto the first page of Exhibit 7 -P and the cor-
rected figures on the various detailed items as corrected 
on page 1 of Exhibit 8-P to page 3 of Exhibit 7. All the 
i terns of expenses of producing rock ·after Boyles left 
the quarry were testified to by Mrs. Sprague and sup-
ported by documentary evidence. 
It is apparent that Hon. Martin M. Larson left out 
some part of his calculation-s in the first paragraph of 
page 5 of his memorandum decision. Multiplying 5485 
tons by 45.5 cents does not bring a result of $4,49·5.55, 
nor does multiplying said 5485 tons by 48 cents bring a 
result of $4,632.80. 
Attention of this Court is called to the closing para-
graph of Judge Larson's J.\!Iemorandum which is as fol-
lows: 
"Without setting forth herein the detailed 
working of in figures, and items, which we have 
done from three different approaches, and work-
ing in each detail of c·xpense ·and deduction with 
the variation between largest and smallest, we 
find the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum 
of $8,334.80 for which they are entitled to judg-
ment against defendant, together with $2,000 
attorney's fees and costs." (R. 25) 
This shows a detailed and careful consideration of 
the matter by the trier of the facts. 
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The appellant complain., on page 30 of its brief 
about the sale of 1,000 tons of rock. The subcontract 
provided that, if the breaking of the rock into sizes there-
in provided for resulted in the production of rock of 
any size which is saleable, Sprague agreed to pay Boyles 
for all such rock at the rate of forty-eight cents per ton 
(R. 9, Par. 7). Sprague, in his account, gave Boyles 
credit for this rock which was sold to Mathews in the 
sum of $1,185.23, which was credit at the cost of Sprague 
in producing the rock (R. 138). This rock, which was sold 
to Mathews, was in sizes of 1,000 pounds or over (R. 
251). It was not rock which was acceptable to he used 
on the revetment (R. 252). Mathews gave credit to 
Sprague for this rock in the sum of $1,000 on a bill for 
the rental.of equipment (R. 251). Certainly appeUant has 
no just complaint about this. 
This Court's attention is called to the exhibits, 
which appellant refers to as packages and bundles on 
page 33 of its brief, and which were testified to by Mrs. 
Sprague (R. 141-148). The first so-called package or 
bundle was Exhibit 16-P aPd was identified by Mrs. 
Sprague as the weekly payrc ll records to support the 
items on Exhibit 7 -P. These were the records from which 
she made a recap of the charges for labor used in pro-
duction of rock which recap was designated as Exhibit 
16 P-A (R. 146 and 147). Exhibits 16-P and 16 P-A were 
for the period prior to Boyles leaving the job. Exhibits 
23-P and 23 P-A were the payroll records and recap by 
Mrs. Sprague of that part of the payroll which was 
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charged against appellant for the period after Boyles left 
the job, from September 30 to November 18, 1950 (R. 
151 and 152). Respondents believe that these exhibits 
and others of similar character were proper exhibits 
and properly received in evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE PLAIN-
TIFFS THE SUM OF $823.15 FOR INCREASED COSTS 
OF LOADING AND HAULING THE ROCK. 
There is ample evidence in the record to support 
this finding of dmnage to the respondents. This dam-
age occurred prior to the time when Boyles left the 
quarry and was caused by the manner of the breaking 
of the rock and the oversize condition of the rock which 
n1ade it necessary for Sp1~ague to sort the rock, set aside 
the oversize rock, which of necessity cost him added 
expense for loading the trucks, and the truck drivers 
were delayed because of the lack of rock of available 
size to be loaded on the trucks and this made it neces-
sary to pay the truckers an increased amount per ton 
for hauling the rock. 
Mrs. Sprague prepared Exhibit 31-P. She prepared 
this from the records of Sprague. This exhibit shows the 
average cost to Sprague of loading when Boyles was pro-
ducing rock as compared with the average cost to 
Sprague of loading when Sprague was producing rock 
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(R. 157). It cost Sprague 12.9 cents per ton more to 
load while Boyles was in the quarry producing rock. This 
item alone amounts to $823.15 for 6381 tons broken by 
Boyles after the trouble wii-h the truckers. There is 
ample evidence that there were delays caused by Boyles 
not having rock ready to be hauled (R. 111, 167, 168). 
In addition to this, because the truckers had to vvait to 
be loaded when rock was not available and while the 
opera tor of the shovel was sorting rock, the price paid 
to the truckers was increased from 70 cents per ton to 
80 cents per ton (R. 268). 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS $850 ON ACCOUNT OF SPRAGUE'S F AlLURE TO 
COMPLETE HIS PRIME CONTRACT ON TIME. 
There is no dispute on the law pertaining to the 
right of a contractor to abandon his contract under cer-
tain circumstances for failure to be paid for his work, 
as it progresses, as provided in the contract. However, 
in this case there is no evidence that appellant abandoned 
its contract because of the failure to pa,y. It is true that 
the payment of $4,392.00 became due by the terms of the 
contract on April 20, 1950 and that it was not paid until 
July 26, 1950. Under the evidence and reasonable inter-
pretation of the contract, there may be some question 
of the right to have and receive the payment on April 
20, 1950, on which date much less than 12,200 tons of 
rock had been broken by appellant. The payment was 
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75% of the contract price for breaking 12,200 tons of 
rock. Since that amount of rock was not broken even 
on July 26, 1950, perhaps the payment made was pre-
m·ature. rrhis, however, is besjde the point because there 
is absolutely no evidence that there was an abandonment 
of the contract by appellant because of the late payment 
and appellant continued to wo·rk on the project for more 
than two months after the payment was received by it. 
As hereinbefore pointed out, Sprague was delayed 
by failure of Boyles to perform its contract of breaking 
rock in sufficient time to give Sprague the necessary 
time to deliver and place the rock on the levee within 
the time limit of the principal contract. This was re-
quired by the subcontract (R. 8 and 10, Par. 2 and 10). 
There is no dispute about the penalty of $1050 being in-
voked by the government against Sprague for delay. Ex-
tensions were granted by the government for delays 
which were reasonable. The Court found that Boyles 
was responsible for a portion of the penalty and gave 
damages for the amount whjch Sprague was penalized 
for the delay caused by Boyles (R. 24 and 27). Elsewhere 
in this brief references are made to the record whlch 
show that rock was not readily available in sizes to be 
hauled to the levee because of the condition of the rock 
in the quarry after the blast of F'ebruary 3, 1950, that 
the operator of the shovel 1n the quarry had to sort 
rock and cast aside the oversize rock and that trucks 
had to wait for rock because it was not available. Further 
reference appears to be unnecessary. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
POINT VI 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COM-
PANY IS NOT LIABLE TO DEFENDANT. 
As surety on the performance and payment bonds 
of Sprague, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany would have been liabb if the principal, Sprague, 
was liable. These bonds were furnished as required by 
Section 270, Title 40, United Rtates Code. The provision 
of the United States Code is as follows: 
"Every suit instituted under this section shall 
be brought in the nam.e of the United States for 
the use of the person suing, in the United States 
Court for any district in which the contract was 
to be performed and executed and not elsewhere, 
irrespective of the ainount in controversy in such 
suit, but no such suit shall be commenced after the 
expiration of one year after the date of final 
settlement by such contract. The United States 
shall not be liable for the payment of any costs 
or expenses of any such suit." 
It is obvious that in thi8 action no recovery can be 
had against the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany. Appropriate defenses were set up in the reply 
calling the attention of the Court to the above provision 
of the Code (R. 17 and 18). 
In an apparent attempt to get around the above 
provisions of the Code, appellant contended that United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company made a new agree-
ment with Boyles. Neither the testimony of Mr. Douglas 
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(R. 95 to 97), nor the Exhibits 27-P and 28-D, establish 
anything other than the fact that United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company, as the surety on the bonds of 
Sprague, was responsible for the performance of 
Sprague on his contract with the government and the 
payment of his obligations. 
The trial Court found that there was no failure to 
furnish compressed air and, of course, if that finding 
is sustained hy this Court, thi:; point will he disposed of. 
On page 42 of appellant's brief, reference is made 
to the original complaint filed in the first action. This 
was a separate case, No. 96365 in the same Court, the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. Respondents' coun-
sel is embarrassed about the mistake made when prepar-
ing and filing that complaint. It was filed September 2, 
1952 (R. 44). The new action, which is the case which 
has been tried and is now 1:efore the Court, was filed 
August 6, 1953 (R. 10, hack of page). A short explana-
tion appears necessary concerning the mistake made by 
respondents' counsel in the filing of the complaint in 
Case No. 96365. At the time of filing this complaint, 
I thought that the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company had issued a bond for Boyles Bros. Drilling 
Company, covering the performance of Boyles Bros. 
Drilling Company on its contract with Sprague for the 
production of the rock to be used by Sprague in the per-
formance of his contract wit!! the government and I so 
alleged in paragraph 2 of said complaint (R. 43 and 44). 
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This was not true as I later discovered. No bond had 
been issued by United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com-
pany for Boyles but bonds had been issued for Sprague. 
This mistake was not discovered by me until several 
months had passed possibly because the defendant, 
Boyles, in its answer (R. 45, Par. 2) admitted the issu-
ance of the bond which had not been issued. This admis-
sion was not true; it likewise was a mistake. Two wrongs 
did not make a right and when I discovered my error, 
I attempted to obtain leave of Court to file an amended 
complaint in that action, No. 96365, in which at that tirne 
I did not attempt to state a cause of action on behalf of 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, but be-
lieved that recovery could be had in the nan1e of Walter 
W. Sprague, who was the real party in interest, and that 
the amount paid out by surety could be recovered on 
the theory of subrogation. The trial Corurt denied my 
motion to file the amended complaint (R. 57). It then 
became necessary to file this &ction. Appellant has raised 
objection ·to it, which objection has been decided against 
it by the lower Court. It continues its objection under 
point X of its brief. The so-called positive allegation of 
liability referred to on page 42 of appellant's brief is 
found in paragraph 2 of the original complaint (R. 43 
and 44). This allegation was made by mistake. I have 
been embarrassed many times on various motions and 
arguments about it. I am ernbarrassed now to be under 
the necessity of again explaining it. Explanation of this 
mistake was made under oath at the trial of the case 
(R. 379). 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFF $292.80 FOR ROCK PURCHASED. 
Although the Court sustained objection to the offer 
of the exhibits on the purchase of rock (R.. 81), testimony 
was allowed to he received on the number of tons pur-
chased (R. 82). The amount purchased was 116 tons for 
which was paid $3.00 per ton. The rock was necessary 
after the quarry was finally closed to complete the last 
of the contract. 
The Court required a reduction from the cost of the 
rock at $3 per ton, or $348 the contract price of 48 cents 
per ton, or $55.20, and allowed as damages the difference, 
$292.80. I cannot find in the record any place where 
anyone testified about the cost of the rock at $3.00 per 
ton or that it was reasonable that the rock he purchased 
rather than reopen the quarry to produce such a small 
amount. It may he that the trial Judge considered the 
Exhibit 2-t-P to which objection to its admission he had 
sustained ( R. 81). If this be error, it is on a very small 
ite1n and there should be no reversal or new trial granted 
hut only an order to reduce the judgment by the amount 
of this item, $292.80. 
POINT VIII 
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
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The Court found that plaintiff, Walter W. Sprague, 
performed his part of the eon tract dated January 25, 
1950, between the plaintiff and defendant (R. 27). 
That was the ultimate fact for the Court to find. 
vVould anything have been added to say in the finding 
"Plaintiff furnished defenda.nt with compressed air to 
operate its drills efficiently~' 1 When it caine to the 
breaches of the contract on the part of defendant, the 
Court specified exactly what those breaches were. From 
the memorandum decision given by the Court, it is clear 
that, while there were times that Boyles was temporarily 
hampered by lack of air, they were such as would be rea-
sonably expected to occur and not sufficient in time or 
effect to constitute a recision or cancellation of the con-
tract (R. 22). The finding and the written decision 
should be considered together and it appears that there 
can be no doubt but what the Court found that Sprague 
furnished adequate compres~ed air to Boyles. 
POINT IX 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. THE 
COURT DID FIND ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES RAIS-
ED BY THE PLEADINGS. 
This point in answer to appellant's Point IX 
1s very similar to Point VIII. Respondents have 
no quarrel with the rule of law that the failure 
of the trial Court to make findings of fact on all material 
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spondents contend that such findings were made. In the 
case cited by appellant, the Court made no finding on an 
issue of abandonment raised by defendant's answer. The 
defense in the present case was that the plaintiff had 
not performed his part of the contract. The Court found 
that the plaintiff had perforwed. If this finding is not 
specific enough and the failure to find specifically as to 
furnishing of air, making payment, and removing broken 
rock from the quarry by ~prague is prejudicial, then the 
most that should be required, as was done in the case of 
Gaddis Investment Comp,any v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 
27S P. 2d 284, is that the judgment be set aside and the 
cause remanded to the Distriet Court with directions to 
1nake proper findings and enter judgment in harmony 
therewith. Where a written memorandum was filed by 
the trial judge in which he stated that there was no fail-
ure to furnish air and the finding of the Court that the 
plaintiff performed his part of the contract, the defend-
ant was not prejudiced in any way by not having a de-
tailed finding that each thing, which was to be done by 
the plaintiff in the performance of the contract, was 
done by him. 
POINT X 
THE PRESENT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN ABATED BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF 
ANOTHER SUIT. 
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The facts concerning the filing of the original action 
No. 96365 have been discussed under Point VI of this 
brief and will not again be discussed here. 
Certainly plaintiffs were entitled to have their case 
against Boyles tried in a case where the complaint prop-
erly alleged the true facts and the plaintiffs' theory of 
their right to recover. Respondents' counsel thought that 
the trial Court, in its discretion, should have permitted 
the amendment to the original complaint. The proposed 
amended complaint did state a cause of action on a new 
and different theory and this was urged upon the trial 
Court by appellant as ground for denying the motion to 
amend. 
After the commencement of the original action No. 
96365, when it was discovered that plaintiffs' counsel 
was mistaken about the alleged issuance of a bond for 
Boyles and the Court refused to permit the filing of an 
amended con1plaint, there was only one thing which could 
be done and that was the filing of a new action. This 
mistake cost the plaintiffs the expense of paying another 
fee for filing another action and paying for the service 
of another summons. The first action, No. 96365, has 
never been tried and when the present case now before 
the Court is concluded, the fil'st action can be dismissed. 
The appellant has not been injured. It has not been 
required to go through two trials and all the rights of the 
parties will be finally determined in the case now before 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
the Court. The plaintiffs should not be deprived of their 
day in Court by an error of counsel in making a mistaken 
allegation in the onginal complaint which allegation was 
also mistakenly admitted by defendant. 
The case of State v. California Packing Corpo~ation, 
105 lTtah 191, 145 P. 2d 784, does not support the appel-
lant's position. In that case a demurrer was sustained 
to plaintiffs' amended complaint hy the trial Court; 
plaintiffs refused to plead further; the case was dis-
missed with prejudice and the Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment in an earlier decision. The State, in the 
case before the Court on rehearing, contended that the 
dismissal of the action should not be a bar to its main-
taining another action based on the facts alleged in its 
original complaint and asked the Supreme Court to so 
hold. The following statement from the case appearing 
on page 785 of 145 P. 2d indicates that a litigant is en-
titled to his day in Court even though one action has 
been dismissed with prejudice when new and additional 
facts might be alleged in a new complaint. 
''The dismissal of plaintiff's action, although 
with prejudice, does not bar plaintiff from main-
taining another acti,m against the defendant 
based on the same facts alleged in the original 
complaint providing the new complaint supplies 
new and additional facts, so that the new com-
plaint alleges different facts and states a cause 
of action. The dismissal of the action is with 
prejudice only to the extent that it determined 
once and for all that 1he complaint attacked by 
demurrer did not state facts sufficient to consti-
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tute a cause of action and bars the maintenance of 
a new action on the same facts which were alleged 
in the complaint which was dismissed." 
The Court, in the same case on page 786 of 145 P. 2d, 
quotes from the case of Gould v. Evansville & C.R. Co., 
91 U.S. 526, 534, 23 L. Ed. -!lG, 419: 
"* * * but it is equally well settled, that, if 
the plaintiff fails on demurrer in his first action 
from the omission of an essential allegation in 
his declaration which is fully supplied in the sec-
ond suit, the judgment in the first suit is no bar 
to the second, although the respective actions 
were instituted to enforce the same right; for the 
reason that the merits of the cause, as disclosed in 
the second declaration, were not heard and de-
cided in the first action." 
SU11IMARY 
Appellant has raised many points upon which it 
relies for a reversal of the judgnwnt. Respondents have 
answered all the objections ::·aised. Some trivial errors 
or mistakes may have been made in this rather involved 
litigation. The record is rather long. It consists of 
more than 400 pages. No attempt has been made by re-
spondents to point out all of the evidence on each point 
raised where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, 
but only sufficient to show to this Court that each find-
ing is supported by substantial competent evidence. 
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As held by this Court in the cases of Startin v. Mad-
s.en, 237 P. 2d 834, and Hillyard v. Utah By-Products 
Co., 1 U. 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287, errors should be dis-
regarded unless they are so substantial as to affect the 
rights of the parties or the likely outcome of the case. 
Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIOTT W. EVANS 
for EvANs, NEsLEN & ELGGREN 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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